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ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 
EMU, the UK and their future? 
by M Demertzis*, K M Low**, and P McAdam* 
*Department of Economics, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow 
**Fraser of Allander Institute, University of, Strathclyde, Glasgow 
Introduction 
Economic and Monetary Union will take place on 
1st January 1999 between a core of 'rich' countries 
leaving a 'two-speed' Europe which will show 
increasing divergence between the rich and the 
poor. This problem will be further compounded by 
the expansion of the EU when the countries of 
Eastern Europe are admitted. This leaves the 
question of the how the UK fits into Europe; should 
it enter EMU with the core countries or would it be 
better off in the periphery ? This paper assesses 
European Monetary Union, (EMU), giving the 
economic and political rationale behind it and the 
problems underlying the politically driven agenda. 
The scenario of a two-speed Europe is discussed at 
length and the implications for the UK of two speed 
monetary union are critically appraised. 
The Background of EMU 
Economies in Europe had been ravished by the 
Second World War and national currencies were not 
convertible. The Bretton Woods agreement in 1944 
did not support international trade until 1958-59. 
The International Monetary Fund, (IMF), was 
established in 1945 and introduced a system of 
fixed exchange rates which linked all currencies to 
the US dollar and the US dollar to gold, (the Gold 
Standard). Changes in parities were only allowed in 
the case of a fundamental imbalance between 
government revenues and spending. In Europe, 
efforts to co-ordinate trade led Germany, France, 
Belgium, Holland, Luxembourg and Italy to sign 
the Treaty of Rome in 1959 establishing the 
European Economic Community, (EEC). The main 
elements of the Treaty were the customs union, (the 
Common Market) and the Common Agricultural 
Policy, (CAP). The aspirations of the EEC went 
further; economic policy coordination and the 
balance of payments were dealt with in the Treaty. 
Further conjunctural policy and exchange rate 
policy were to be a matter of common concern. By 
the end of the 1960s the customs union had been 
completed and the CAP implemented ahead of 
schedule. 
The Werner Report in 1970 detailed the way 
forward to EMU implying 'the total and irreversible 
convertibility of currencies, the elimination of 
fluctuation in exchange rates, the irrevocable fixing 
of parity rates and the complete liberation of 
movements of capital'. The Bretton Woods system 
broke down in the 1970s. In Europe inflation and 
unemployment rates grew but at different speeds. 
The European Monetary System, (EMS), was 
created at the end of the 1970s and included the 
Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) and the 
European Currency Unit (ECU). The ERM would 
allow currencies to fluctuate in ±2.25% bands, (with 
some exceptions), and parity adjustments were 
subject to mutual agreements between the parties 
concerned. The ECU was defined as a weighted 
basket of European currencies and was the 
accounting unit of the EMS. The EMS began 
operating in March 1979 but twelve realignments of 
currencies were required before the ERM could 
maintain stable parities in Europe. This was mainly 
due to the very slow recovery from the oil crisis. 
Further steps were taken towards EMU when the 
Delors Report of April 1989 set out the necessary 
criteria for EMU; 
total convertibility of currencies; 
complete liberalisation of capital flows and 
full integration of markets; 
irrevocable locking of exchange rates and 
the subsequent adoption of a single 
currency; 
The European Council meeting in Maastricht in 
1991 adopted the Delors Report and ratified 
amendments to the Treaty of Rome making 
monetary union binding. The Maastricht Treaty 
established: 
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the European Central Bank1, (ECB), 
responsible for handling the single 
currency; 
a specific timetable for EMU; and 
for the European Community, (EC), to be 
renamed the European Union, (EU). 
It also sets out five criteria that countries should 
fulfil before proceeding to EMU: 
price stability: inflation of no more than V/,% 
above the average of the best three performing 
economies over a period of one year; 
fiscal stability: a government deficit to GDP ratio 
of no more than 3% and government debt to GDP 
ratio of no more than 60%, both at market prices; 
exchange rate stability: the currency must be 
operating within the normal bands of the ERM 
without any realignments for the last two years; 
nominal long term interest rates: these should not 
be more than 2% above the average of the three 
countries with the lowest interest rates. 
The Maastricht criteria are discussed fully below. 
For those moving towards EMU by 1st January 
1999, national currencies will still prevail for three 
years but then substitution of national currencies by 
the Euro will take place in 2002. The Euro will still 
of course be subject to fluctuations against other 
currencies outside the EU but has the potential to 
be the largest reserve currency with the exception 
of the dollar. The economic rationale for a single 
currency is that it is a store of value, with the ECB 
maintaining tight monetary policy; it eliminates 
many of the transaction costs in EU trade; and by 
abolishing national currencies exchange rate 
uncertainty is avoided. 
Is Europe an optimal currency area? 
Can countries afford to hand over their monetary 
instruments to the ECB to apply a common 
monetary policy? How should the fiscal tool be 
used in the absence of country specific monetary 
targets? Should countries coordinate their fiscal 
policy to avoid fiscal indiscipline or can they be 
allowed to cater for the country specificities 
especially in the absence of a monetary tool? The 
The ECB would be politically and economically 
independent but it would report to the institutions that are 
politically responsible. 
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answers to these questions determine the extent to 
which Europe is an Optimal Currency Area, (OCA), 
i.e. an area in which a single currency will 
stimulate growth without imposing extra costs. 
There are cultural reasons for not having a single 
currency, simply because the public identify with 
their own national currency and know what it 
represents. There are economic criteria however that 
explain existing financial borders which combined 
with sociological reasons define national currencies. 
The fulfilment of these criteria gives a level of 
homogeneity in economic structures that will 
sustain a single currency and optimise trade. If no 
common ground exists then the only sensible means 
of establishing exchange between countries is 
through national currencies. The criteria required 
for countries to be an OCA are: 
they have similar inflation rates 
there is a high degree of factor mobility 
between them with flexible wages and 
prices 
the economies are open to trade 
there is a high degree of product diversion 
they are hit by symmetric shocks 
Whether Europe satisfies this criteria or not is a 
moot point but even currency unions like the US do 
not comply with all the theoretical conditions. The 
important point is that where a region diverges from 
average economic performance there is a 
mechanism that provides assistance and promotes 
recovery: 
Fiscal federalism 
The US has a Federal budget which represents 40% 
of national income. Redistribution of funds to 
regions experiencing economic hardship requires a 
central fiscal authority, i.e. the National 
government. The two crucial factors are the 
freedom to take political decisions and a budget of 
an adequate size. Neither of these are present in 
Europe as it stands. The design of EMU is for 
fiscal policy to be operated domestically. In Europe 
only 1.5% is available for redistribution and this is 
almost entirely taken up by the CAP. The absence 
of such a buffer concentrates all the effort to trying 
to satisfy the OCA criteria as closely as possible in 
a determined effort to avoid fiscal redistribution at 
all costs. These efforts have failed for two principal 
reasons; firstly the efforts to achieve convergence 
required for the sustainability of a single currency 
can only go so far without imposing costs 
elsewhere i.e. in the real sector. Concentration on 
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inflation control over the past 15 years has had a 
negative effect on demand causing high 
unemployment and the underlying production 
structures have adapted to repressed demand 
generating high structural unemployment which is 
now hard to solve, (see Figure 5 and Table 1). 
Secondly, even if OCA criteria are satisfied2, there 
will always be unforseen shocks that affect 
individual countries asymmetrically. That requires 
a stabilisation tool equivalent to the redistributive 
mechanism of the US. Paradoxically, such a system 
is considered infeasible in Europe despite the 
general agreement that EMU is politically driven. 
This has resulted in the promotion of convergence 
in view of achieving as good an OCA as possible. 
Convergence criteria and interpretation 
The convergence criteria (see Figures 1-4) are 
outlined above and countries should satisfy them by 
either 1997 or 1999. An examination will take place 
in the Spring of 1998 and progress to EMU will be 
determined by qualified majority voting. It is 
therefore not simply a matter of meeting a set of 
agreed economic criteria but a political decision. 
There are strong economic arguments to justify 
meeting the criteria but their fulfilment still poses 
a considerable adjustment burden on participating 
economies, Hughes Hallet, McAdam, (1996a, b, c). 
Common convergence to low and stable inflation is 
necessary for trade and demand stability; if 
countries entered EMU with markedly different 
inflation rates then there would be, in the immediate 
absence of offsetting factor movements, chronic 
unemployment and competitiveness problems. 
Stable exchange rates are an indicator of readiness 
for exchange rate locking and convergence on long 
term interest rates should automatically occur as 
monetary and fiscal policies converge while positive 
expectations are formed about the success and 
stability of the EMU. With perfect capital mobility 
borrowing rates should tend to equalise anyway -
with the only outstanding difference being debt-
default risk premia. The fiscal criteria are to make 
financial crises less likely in EMU and to avoid 
undermining the credibility and policy stance of the 
ECB. 
The UK entered the ERM at too high a rate, 
£1=2.95DM, and also was unfortunate in entering 
when monetary conditions in Germany following 
2Let us say as much as they are in the USA, in the 
absence of an absolute measure. 
re-unification led to high interest rates across IJie 
EU. Irrespective of its long-term commitmenu to 
the ERM, the UK would be a good candidate :hi 
EMU on the inflation and fiscal criteria. Progress 
on these targets for the rest of the EU has bwn 
difficult. The convergence criteria, particularly in 
France have hampered EU growth. In 1995 only 
three countries, (out of fifteen), meet the fiscal 
criteria, (Luxembourg, Denmark and Ireland), wh 3fct 
only four meet the debt criteria, (the previous thjeee 
plus Germany), with some wildly short of the d«=% 
target (notably Italy, Belgium, Greece, Ireland and 
Sweden). Inflation performance across the EU is 
promising with almost all passing the threshoii. 
With Italy returning to the ERM the economc 
impetus towards EMU is higher now than it was 
two years ago. The outstanding problem remains-
that of fiscal convergence and the adjustment 
process will invariably be felt on the real side rof 
the economy - on output and employment. 
If EU countries do fulfil these criteria and reach 
EMU, (at whatever stage), the benefits of tfcit 
regime are believed to be small. They ai« 
investment gains due to reduced interest rate;, 
(diminished exchange rate uncertainty and risk 
premia), reduced transactions costs, stable prices 
and the improved bargaining powers of the EU. Un 
quantifiable terms these gains are assumed tto 
amount to annual growth effects of 0.4% (reducti am 
in transaction costs); 0.3% (price transparency); aid 
0.7% (reduced exchange rate uncertainty), summing 
to 1.4% of EU GDP, (EC, 1990). Normally such an 
advantage is small and must be regarded as even 
smaller if only a core group of countries forms 
EMU. If this, (average), figure of 1.4% were to tie 
larger we still know little about the robustness if 
the EMU regime. For example the partial 
withdrawal of fiscal policy running up to tins 
convergence period, (and possibly beyond with tlte 
new 'stability pact'), seriously constrains policy m 
stabilising the economy around shocks and so risks 
prolonging and deepening those shocks - thus 
potentially making the EMU a highly unstable 
regime. 
What are the possible scenarios for EMU? 
There are three possible EMU scenarios, (excluding 
no EMU), and they are in order of increasing 
probability: 
One speed EMU, broad membership on time: 
This is the least likely scenario bringing about :a 
much looser monetary union because there a;; 
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difficulties in meeting the convergence criteria. It 
would appear that at least some participating 
economies have not converged enough to make the 
EMU a stable regime. It is the most likely to lead 
to a break up of a single currency. 
One Speed EMU but delayed : 
If the convergence criteria are not met by 1999 then 
the EMU creation date could be extended to some 
time in the near future to signal credibility to the 
markets and to offset the danger of a prolonged 
appreciation of the DM which will incur further 
adjustment costs. The main obstacle to delay is the 
huge political stimulus that EMU has been given to 
happen on time. 
Two speed EMU, narrow membership on time: 
This is almost certainly the most plausible outcome 
- EMU will take place on 1/1/99 and will include a 
narrow group of countries, Germany, France, 
Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Austria and 
probably Ireland and Finland. Some countries for 
example Italy and Spain have not converged enough 
therefore have not signalled to their partners and 
financial markets that they have the appropriate 
monetary and fiscal discipline for EMU. Some 
countries - such as the UK and Denmark - have 
strong incentives to remain outside EMU. 
A two-speed regime 
The Maastricht Treaty requires that on the 1st of 
January 1999 there is a nucleus of a Monetary 
Union formed, composed of at least seven 
countries. That implies that only those countries that 
have managed to meet the convergence criteria will 
be allowed to adopt a single currency and more 
importantly will be able to make it a credible 
commitment. The remaining countries will still 
maintain use of their national monetary instruments 
till monetary convergence is attained. This is the 
two-speed3 EMU with the remaining countries 
forming a periphery which will be allowed to join 
as soon as they satisfy the criteria. In economic 
terms, the rationale for two-speeds is justified by 
the evidence that the core is closer to meeting the 
nominal criteria prescribed in the Maastricht Treaty 
and in that sense, stands a much better chance of 
being an OCA that would benefit from a single 
J
 Or even more speeds if we are to allow for the 
fact that there will be new countries from the East and 
the South of Europe that will join the EU. 
currency. However, the division of the EU into 
different groups, immediately casts doubt on the 
basis on which this division is made and challenges 
whether classifying countries in that particular way 
contributes towards the final goal. If unemployment 
and growth performance for example, were to be 
the criteria of choice instead, the set of countries 
forming the core group would be distinctively 
different. The choice of the current criteria is of 
course a reflection of what the ordering of relative 
priorities in the pursuit of European economic 
policies has been, with price stability claiming an 
exclusive place at the top. It is the pursuit of such 
rigid anti-inflationary policies that has proved very 
destructive for the real side of the European 
economies and ultimately for the nominal side as 
well, (break-up of the ERM). Even if we were to 
accept that the present group of convergence criteria 
is justified on economic grounds, the choice to 
differentiate between the 'ins' and 'outs' may still be 
deemed discriminatory. 
The proposal made by the German CDU (1994) on 
the issue of 'multiple-speeds' and 'variable geometry' 
is perhaps the first official document which 
transforms the issue from theoretical speculation to 
strategic pragmatism. However, despite the very 
lucid German objectives and the economic case for 
the core forming a better OCA in comparison to the 
whole of the EU, there remains a distinct 
impression that policy makers have somehow 
managed to make a virtue out of a necessity 
without having done the appropriate cost-benefit 
analysis which would allow them to properly 
evaluate such a regime. This impression arises 
from the large number of questions left unanswered 
concerning how such a multiple speed regime will 
function and eventually attain its primary goal. 
There is a paradox, in the inevitability with which 
we are about to institutionalise a two-speed 
Monetary Union, when so little economic analysis 
has been done to illustrate its merits as a 
transitional arrangement to the adoption of a single 
currency. This leaves the discussion to be conducted 
on elusive and unfortunately speculative grounds. 
To illustrate the point, some of the questions that 
need to be answered before proceeding with a two-
speed arrangement are presented below. 
• The Maastricht Treaty clearly indicates the 1st of 
January 1999, (originally 1997), as the first date for 
the adoption of a single currency. There remains 
however, a lot of uncertainty as to whether this will 
actually occur, arising from the markets' perception 
that countries (even some of the ones that would 
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traditionally form part of the core) will not have the 
economic structure needed to maintain it. This 
arises from the fact that satisfying the Maastricht 
criteria is now an increasingly difficult target to 
attain within the prescribed time. 
• Equally uncertain is the number of countries that 
will participate. For those countries that perhaps 
satisfy the Maastricht criteria and can therefore 
form part of the core, they need to know what the 
implications will be if they choose not to participate 
(the UK being very much the case in point). On 
the other hand those countries that are not allowed 
to proceed immediately with a common currency, 
will want to be told what time scale they need to 
consider in their economic planning for these 
criteria to be fulfilled and more importantly how the 
core will assist them in the catching up process. 
Exclusion, either by choice or by necessity, must 
involve some costs that will provide the right 
incentives for Monetary Union to be formed. At the 
moment however, these costs are not obvious to the 
'dissidents' or indeed to anybody else and even if 
they were they would not necessarily be 
counteracted by the risks implied by a badly 
designed Monetary Union. Unfortunately, the 
degree of transparency required to clarify all these 
points is still missing. 
• More specifically it is important to know how the 
periphery will function in relation to the core. Will 
it form an interbloc ERM, float against the new 
currency formed, or will it explicitly coordinate 
without the framework of an ERM? Will the 
countries in the periphery cooperate amongst 
themselves and the core, or act as a competitive 
fringe? 
• If the core is to adopt a leader's role, then how 
leading should it be? It is important to know how 
far the leading position of the core should be 
allowed to set the agenda for both the core and 
peripheral members. What system will show how 
the followers evolve from the periphery to the core 
and how will the leaders assist this process? 
• This of course naturally leads to the question of 
the institutions required to support such an 
arrangement. The operations of the ECB are 
immediately affected by a two-speed framework. 
Although its original statute requires representatives 
from all countries in the EMU to carry out one 
single monetary policy, its activities will have to be 
limited to the monetary policy for the core, decided 
only by the core's representatives. This implies that 
the remaining countries will not be able to influence 
the decision process; in that respect policy makers 
of the peripheral countries will be left to their own 
devices to manage their monetary instrument. In 
fact Martin (1995) highlights this split of carrying 
out of monetary policy and suggests that with no 
explicit rules to either restrain their monetary 
policies or direct them towards the monetary 
objectives of the EMU countries, the periphery will 
manage to free-ride by competitively devaluing 
their own currencies thus threatening the function of 
the CAP and the Single Market. 
• From the argument that the existence of a national 
currency gives ultimately the opportunity to the 
policy makers to use it, the lack of credibility that 
the ERM entailed, is automatically re-introduced. 
The perceived way of handling this is with 
unlimited intervention from the ECB to sustain the 
currencies that might potentially come under 
speculative attacks. However, although this is an 
effective way of solving the problem, the political 
will required for this to happen is non existent. 
• There is undoubtedly a political element in the 
choice to proceed in multiple speeds, which if it 
becomes part of EMU's design, may threaten the 
stability of a genuine Monetary Union for all. 
Examples of political interventions would be the 
inclusion of Belgium or Ireland in the core despite 
their official debt rat ios, curtai l ing 
structural/cohesion funds before new members join, 
tightening the convergence criteria after the Treaty 
was agreed, redefining what counts in the budget or 
what counts as 'normal' fluctuations bands or what 
counts as 'sufficient progress' back towards the 
official criteria. It is not that the decision to form 
EMU will or indeed should be free of any political 
bias. However, it is very important to realise that 
actions taken need to be incentive compatible in 
order to generate the mechanism that will make the 
system sustainable. 
• Lastly, it is of great relevance to the final outcome 
whether the system is divisive or conducive. In 
other words, if all countries of the European Union 
are to ultimately adopt a single currency, then we 
must ensure that a two-speed arrangement maintains 
a transitory character and during its operation it 
induces greater convergence by assisting the 
periphery. This is, without doubt, the most 
important point that the architects of this regime 
must address. 
The UK and EMU 
The UK has a choice; to participate in EMU on 
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time or to stay out. It is a dilemma rather than a 
choice and the response will be governed largely by 
what the government of the day sees as most 
advantageous to the UK. The decision to participate 
will be political not economic. The convergence 
criteria appear to be surplus to requirements which 
is ironic as the UK is in a position to meet most of 
these. The benefits are seen to be largely marginal 
and at the worst could be overturned into net costs. 
The Conservatives view EMU with a great deal of 
scepticism as they value deregulated markets, 
privatisation, open trade, competition and free 
enterprise. They are probably reluctant supporters of 
EMU because they see it as a necessary condition 
for access to European markets and retaining some 
power in decision making. The Labour Party is 
concerned about the lack of consideration given to 
real variables particularly unemployment, 
redistribution of income and regional aid. They 
would also reluctantly support EMU because this 
would signal that they would embrace a credible 
monetary policy and pursue low inflation through 
the European Central Bank. Significant doubts still 
exist over the lack of a growth objective. Two 
thirds of the British public are against any further 
integration into Europe but business is divided, 
(Arrowsmith, Taylor 1996; Hughes Hallett 1996). 
It is the asymmetries that exist between the UK and 
its European partners which mean that EMU would 
not be in the best interests of the UK. The UK is 
more sensitive to short term interest rate changes 
and asset values; to the business cycle which leads 
that of Europe; to world trade; to more flexible 
labour markets and has a preference for growth and 
employment policies rather than price stability per 
se. The economy is also more sensitive to changes 
in the oil price, North Sea oil production, output 
shocks in the US as well as being less sensitive to 
German monetary conditions. Asymmetric responses 
to common shocks are important as although they 
tend to be smaller, they are more frequent. It is the 
economic structure of the UK which makes these 
responses different from our European counterparts. 
The main difference is the labour market 
institutions and the mechanisms by which these 
shocks are transmitted to prices, output and 
employment. The fact that half of the UK trade is 
non EU, (Hughes Hallett, 1996), (more than any 
other EU country), also acts against EMU. 
Our previous experience in the ERM where there 
was an inability to realign within the system caused 
major problems resulting in massive hikes in real 
interest rates before sterling actually left the ERM. 
Following the devaluation in 1992 the experience 
post ERM has been one of exceptional economic 
performance which most people are unwilling to 
give up. This may be a lesson; it appeared before to 
be a serious mistake to be outside the ERM so the 
UK joined but once in, leaving because it does not 
suit the country's needs also appears to be 
traumatic. The fact that the UK did quite well may 
indicate that being outside EMU might not be that 
bad. So, the lesson is, 'if it doesn't suit your needs 
don't get boxed in'. The position seems to be, not so 
much that the UK does not want to participate in 
EMU but more that the form of EMU on the menu 
is not to our taste. It is the very design of the 
system which we are unhappy with. However 
changing the design at this late stage appears to be 
a forlorn hope. Alain Juppe, the French Prime 
Minister, has called for unemployment to be 
included at some stage as a criteria of EMU. Other 
countries would also be happier if there were 'real' 
targets rather than the current concentration on price 
stability and financial targets. 
It is widely accepted that the UK will be a 
peripheral country but this does not necessarily 
mean that the UK is to suffer second class 
economic performance. If it stays within the 
Maastricht criteria then it will 'shadow' the core 
countries and at times outperform them. It will not 
be a part of the ERM but is more likely to have 
slightly higher growth and more success at reducing 
unemployment. Further it has strong trading links 
with the US and the Commonwealth. The economy 
is an export oriented economy which must maintain 
its competitive position to be successful. EMU does 
not offer that at the moment. Any restriction on UK 
policies of output growth, wealth creation and 
employment generation would hamper economic 
progress. Sterling is not over/undervalued therefore 
a speculative attack is not an imminent threat. 
London is unlikely to lose out as a financial centre. 
Its great advantage is that it straddles the US and 
Japanese time zones and that in itself is an immense 
asset. However when all government bonds for 
those countries in EMU are issued in 1999 then it 
is reasonable to suppose that the market will be in 
a member country, probably Frankfurt. If the 
primary market is there then large volumes of the 
secondary bond market may also move to Frankfurt. 
The UK is a major recipient of inward investment 
in Europe. This is more important to Scotland, 
Wales, the North East and Northern Ireland. Capital 
flows into the UK are undoubtedly due to lower 
labour market costs, deregulated markets and a 
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skilled workforce. These investments are European 
plants designed with exports to Europe in mind. 
Any restrictions on growth, the labour market and 
competition would undoubtedly deter further 
investment. Both EMU and the Social Chapter 
threaten to increase labour costs. It is for this 
reason that the UK will wish to avoid these. 
The UK has a relatively good fiscal position in 
Europe and it is improving. The UK should be 
concerned that with the ECB running monetary 
policy then the government would only have fiscal 
policy left as an instrument of policy control. 
Unpleasant decisions would therefore require tax 
increases or expenditure cuts. Using fiscal policy 
solely is not thought to be a good idea and political 
parties see the dangers of being boxed into a corner 
if budget deficits are not made good in the upturn. 
Another policy issue to be addressed is the lack of 
coordination between monetary and fiscal policy. 
This was seen in the ERM debacle. 
The UK has promoted growth and recovery 
believing that revenues will grow faster and the 
same outcomes can be achieved more quickly than 
by cutting expenditures which reduces growth. 
Faster deficit reductions will prove to be strongly 
deflationary. In EMU all fiscal issues appear to be 
driven by the debt level rather than deficits. Debt is 
harder to deal with than deficits. Any fiscal 
contraction to reduce debt will also reduce national 
income. There are some perverse problems here 
whereby if the fiscal multipliers are greater than 
one then the ratio will fall by a smaller amount than 
the rate at which absolute debt falls by. It is 
possible that it may even rise slightly. There is a 
large incentive to ignore the debt criteria as 
contractions will only have small impacts on the 
ratio while the large deflations necessary to make 
significant reduction in the ratio will be politically 
unacceptable. If the markets see no action being 
taken then interest rates will rise, again damaging 
growth. 
Unemployment is low in the UK relative to Europe 
but not as low as the US. They have more flexible 
labour markets, higher labour mobility and higher 
wage differentials than the UK. The UK labour 
market operates more like that of the US rather than 
like European labour markets. Wage flexibility is 
small as are fiscal transfers in the UK. 
Unemployment disparities across Europe are 
considerable while mobility is low for cultural and 
linguistic reasons. Both locational competition and 
decentralised wage bargaining have helped to bring 
down relative wages in the UK. It is this 
competitive advantage that the UK does not want to 
surrender to Europe. The asymmetries between the 
UK and her European partners are significant 
obstacles to becoming a core member of EMU 
given its current design and objectives. The costs of 
exclusion from EMU are difficult to quantify but 
they do not appear to be prohibitive. 
Conclusion 
•EMU will take place on 1st January 1999 as a two-
speed arrangement with Germany, France, the 
Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Austria, Ireland 
and Finland forming the core. 
•There are many issues which remain unresolved 
but require to be addressed before a two-speed 
monetary union can proceed satisfactorily 
•The UK will remain on the periphery pursuing 
policies of output growth, wealth creation and 
employment generation but will live in coexistence 
with the core countries of EMU 
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Date 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
U-FRA 
3.7 
4.1 
4.5 
5.1 
5.9 
6.4 
7.4 
8.8 
9.2 
9.9 
10.7 
10.5 
11.5 
11.1 
11.0 
10.5 
9.1 
9.6 
11.1 
12.4 
U_GER 
4.2 
4.8 
4.4 
4.5 
4.0 
3.5 
4.7 
7.0 
9.1 
9.0 
9.3 
9.2 
8.9 
8.9 
8.0 
7.5 
6.3 
6.2 
7.6 
9.2 
U_NET 
5.1 
6.0 
5.1 
5.0 
5.3 
5.2 
8.1 
11.2 
16.6 
18.2 
16.3 
15.4 
14.5 
14.3 
12.6 
8.6 
7.8 
7.3 
6.1 
7.8 
U_GRE 
2.6 
2.2 
1.9 
1.7 
1.8 
2.1 
3.0 
4.5 
6.3 
7.8 
8.0 
7.9 
7.4 
7.5 
7.5 
7.5 
7.8 
8.9 
9.3 
9.7 
U J R E 
7.6 
9.1 
9.1 
8.6 
7.7 
7.1 
9.5 
11.0 
14.0 
16.0 
17.3 
17.7 
18.7 
18.6 
18.3 
17.2 
17.8 
20.3 
15.9 
15.1 
U_ITA 
4.9 
5.6 
6.9 
7.2 
7.6 
7.8 
7.8 
9.4 
10.0 
10.7 
10.4 
11.3 
12.0 
12.5 
12.5 
12.1 
11.3 
11.3 
9.3 
11.2 
U_SPA 
3.3 
4.7 
5.4 
7.0 
8.7 
11.2 
13.6 
15.9 
17.8 
20.0 
22.1 
22.2 
21.5 
20.2 
18.4 
16.8 
16.1 
17.5 
21.4 
24.2 
UR-UK 
2.4 
4.0 
4.6 
5.0 
4.6 
4.3 
6.7 
9.1 
11.1 
11.7 
12.1 
12.4 
12.5 
10.6 
8.6 
6.8 
7.4 
9.5 
10.5 
9.8 
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